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NOTES
This idea has been incorporated in the last Federal Revenue Act.'3
Reservation of income or beneficial interest in the property trans-
ferred. The general rule is that where the grantor reserves to him-
self income from the property transferred or any beneficial interest
therein the transfer is subject to the inheritance tax.14 The rule
applies where the deed is absolute on its face and there is a collateral
agreement reserving the interest in the grantor.
G. M. SHAW.
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BANKS AND BANKING-CRIMINAL LAW-RECEIVING DEPOSITS
WITH KNOWLEDGE OF INSOLVENCY-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-
After defendant bank officers had knowledge that 'the bank was
insolvent, they permitted a teller to continue accepting deposits.
They were indicted, tried, and convicted under a statute which makes
it a felony for any officer of a bank to receive deposits after he be-
comes aware of the bank's insolvency. The statute further renders
such an officer civilly liable for any deposits received by him, "or
with his knowledge or assent." Upon appeal it was held that the
judgment for criminal conviction be reversed.'
The court reaches this surprising result upon two distinct grounds,
the first of which is rather doubtful. 1. That the word "receives,"
strictly construed, means personal reception, and since the defendant
is being prosecuted under the penal section of the statute, it must be
1926 Revenue Act, section 202 (d).
In re Cornell's Estate, 170 N. Y. 425, 63 N. E. 445 (1902). Where owner
of securities gave them with condition that donor should have all or any part
of the income, the gift was taxable; Tipps v. Bass, note 6 supra, In re Leach's
Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 28 Atl. 497 (1925). Even though possession of joint estate
was transferred, if the decedent reserved beneficial interest, the transfer was
taxable; People v. Tavener, 300 Ill. 373, 133 N. E. 211 (1921) conveyances of
land, with reservation of life estate, were deeds granting future estates to take
effect in possession after death of grantor, and the transfer was taxable; Mc-
Caughn v. Girard Trust Co. 11 Fed. (2nd.) 520 (1926). Instrument irrevocably
granting property in trust, to pay income to grantor for life a post mortem
disposition; Reed v. Howbert, 8 Fed. (2nd.) 641 (1925). Creation of trust
not a complete transfer, where donor retained income from trust property;
Smith v. State, 134 Md. 473, 107 Atl. 255 (1919) ; American Bd. v. Bugbee 98
N. J. L. 84, 118 Atl. 700; In re Hanna, 119 Misc. 159, 195 N. Y. Supp. 749;
Todd's Estate, 237 Pa. 466, 85 Atl. 845; contra, In re Harrevman" 98 N. J. E.
638, 129 Atl. 393; In re Cornell's Estate, supra, note 12; Lewis v. Brown, 182
Ia. 738, 166 N. W. 99; In re Choate, 195 Ia. 715, 192 N. W. 857 (1923) ; In re
Baird, 219 App. Div. 418, 219 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1927); Gifts Causa Mortis-
In re Edwards, 85 Hun. 436, 32 N. Y. Supp. 901 (1895).
'State v. Lewis, 139 S. E. 386 (S. C. 1927).
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construed strictly in his favor.2 2. In the section of the statute pro-
viding for civil liability, the legislature specially treated the subject
of the bank officer "receiving" deposits (the basis of criminal lia-
bility) by the addition of the words "or with his knowledge or
assent," thereby leaving the inference that they intended differenti-
ating between the type of reception necessary for civil, as distinguished
from criminal liability.3 At any rate, this special provision in the
section on civil liability, not having been used in the section on
criminal liability, must be assumed to have been designedly omitted
therefrom.
4
The effect of this statute, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion,
is to render the statute nugatory, for all that an officer need do to
avoid criminal liability would be to have a clerk receive deposits, as
was done here. In the absence of the specific language of the statute
relative to civil liability, it is doubtful that the same result would have
been reached, but it appears that the South Carolina court would
have followed the better view that to render a bank officer criminally
liable for receiving deposits after having had knowledge of insol-
vency, it is not necessary that he should have manually received the
depositsYr
Such a point as the one raised in the instant case could not arise
in North Carolina, since C. S. 224g imposes criminal liability on any
bank officer who receives or "permits an employee to receive" de-
posits after the officer had knowledge of the bank's insolvency.
ALVIN S. KARTUS.
The deceased begged a ride with the defendant in his truck. After
proceeding some distance the truck suddenly went down an embank-
ment, turning over several times, which resulted in the death of the
225 R. C. L. 1081-1084, as cited by the court. But see Mills v. So. Ry. 82 S.
C. 242, 64 S. E. 232 (1909), which holds that construction of a statute should
not be so strict as to defeat its obvious purpose. On the same point see also
Littleton v. Harr, 158 N. C. 566, 74 S. E. 12 (1912).
'Where, in a legislative enactment, a special provision is made as to a sub-
ject which would otherwise be embraced in a general provision on the same
subject the special provision is held to be an exception and not intended to be
embraced in the general provision. Enlich on Statutes § 399; 2 Sutherland,
Statutory Constr. (2d ed.) p. 666. Cf. ibid., pp. 401, 420.
'See Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. N. C. 776 (C. P. Eng. 1836), interpreting
several differently worded sections of the Statute of Frauds.
'Hudson v. State, 258 Pac. 352 (Okla. 1927) ; State v. Mitchell, 96 Miss.
259, 51 So. 4, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 309 and note, 26 L. R A. (Ni. s.) 1072 and note
(1910) ; Carr v. State, 104 Ala. 4, 16 So. 150 (1894) ; State v. Cramer, 20 Idaho
639, 119 Pac. 30 (1911) ; State v. Cadwell, 79 Ia. 432, 45 N. W. 700 (1890).
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
plaintiff's intestate. It was found that there was a latent defect in
the steering apparatus of the truck. Held, that the defendant owed
the'deceased, as a gratuitous guest, the duty of exercising ordinary
care to avoid personal injury to him. But the defendant owed him
no duty to inspect and keep his truck in repair. The court indicates
that had the defendant known of the defect he would have been under
a duty to warn his guest. Marple v. Haddad, 138 S. E. 113 (W. Va.
1927). It is highly conjectural, however, that the driver of an auto-
mobile is under any duty to warn a gratuitous guest of the condition
of the automobile.
BILLS AND NOTES-CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT-NEGOTIABILITY-
ADVANCE NOTICE REQUIRED BEFORE PAYMENT-Action by an en-
dorsee of a certificate of deposit against the issuing bank for the
amount of the certificate. The bank claimed the right of set-off for
the indebtedness of the depositor on the grounds that the certificate
was not negotiable, and that the plaintiff was not a holder in due
course. These contentions were based on the reasons, (1) that the
certificate payable to "himself order" showed a conflict of terms, and
as there was no word connecting or separating the words "himself"
and "order," and as "himself" was in writing it would prevail, thus.
the certificate was not payable to order; and (2) that although by its
terms payable twelve months from date, the certificate contained a
provision giving the bank the right to require thirty days notice of the
time of payment, and in consequence the time was indefinite and the
certificate was non-negotiable. The court held that the certificate of
deposit was negotiable, that the plaintiff was a holder in due course
and that the plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's claim of set-off
should be sustained.'
The first question was disposed of by saying that the word "or"
could be interpolated and thus the certificate of deposit would cor-
respond to the requirements of the statute.2 This seems to be a very
'Coffey v. Day & Night Nat. Bank of Pikeville, 21 Fed. (2nd.) 661 (Ky.
1926). The following is a copy of the instrument involved (italics indicating
the written portion). "No 220. Pikeville, Ky., January 5th, 1925. This certifies
that W. P. T. Varney has deposited in this bank thirty-five hundred dollars
($3,500.00) payable to himself order-twelve months after date on return of
this certificate properly endorsed. This bank may require thirty days notice of
the time when payment will be required to meet the requirements of the Federal
Reserve Board regarding time deposits. With 6% interest if left 12 months.
No interest after 12 months unless renewed. Not subject to check. (Signed by
the cashier).
'Ky. Statutes, § 3720-b-8.
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safe basis for the decision considering the instrument as a whole.3
Were it not held good for that reason the decision could be sustained
for other reasons. Granting that there is a conflict between the terms
"himself," "order," as contended by the defendant, and that the term
"himself," being in writing, would prevail, 4 there is still no conflict
between the term "himself" and the remainder of the instrument,
and as the provision "on return of this certificate properly endorsed"
which appeared further on in the instrument has been held to imply
negotiability, the instrument may be held negotiable without the term
"order." 5 In all events the irregularity is not sufficient to put the
plaintiff on notice so his taking would amount to bad faith, for a
mere suspicion, 6 or lack of care in making inquiry will not prevent
him from being a holder in due course.
7
With regard to the second question whether the uncertainty of
the time of payment rendered the instrument non-negotiable, the
defendant relied on cases which involved demand instruments and
which required in addition to the thirty days notice the presentation
of a savings fund passbook as a condition of payment.8 These cases
were properly dismissed from consideration as such condition ren-
dered the time of payment dependent on collateral matters and in-
definite. The provision under consideration in the instant case seems
to present a new question in negotiable instruments, and it remains
to be determined what effect the privilege of the bank to require
thirty days notice before becoming obligated to pay has on the time
of payment in the commercial sense. The specified due date was
stated to be "twelve months after the date issued." 9 To give full
force to this statement would be to restrict the bank's right to require
thirty days notice so that such right could be exercised only in case
payment should be required on or before the specified due date.
Under such a construction the certificate would be in substance a
3Harding v. Cargo of Coal, 147 Fed. 971, 973 (D. C. 1906).4 Ky. Statutes, § 3720-b-17 (4).
'Forrest v. Safety Banking & Trust Co., 174 Fed. 345 (C. C. 1909). See
Kirkwood v. First Nat. Bank, 40 Neb. 484, 58 N. W. 1016, 24 L. 1. A. 444
(1894); Pierce v. St. Nat. Bank of Boston, 215 Mass. 18, 101 N. E. 1060
(1913).
Sinathers v. Hotel Co., 162 N. C. 346, 78 S. E. 224 (1913).
' Walden v. Dowing Co., 4 Ga. App. 534, 61 S. E. 1127 (1908) ; Critcher v.
Ballard, 180 N. C. 111, 104 S. E. 134 (1920).
'First Nat. Bank v. Golden, 19 Cal. App. 501, 126 Pac. 498 (1912),; White
v. Cushing, 88 Me. 339, 34 At. 164, 32 L. R. A. 590 (1896) ; Fisher v. O'Hanlon,
93 Neb. 529, 141 N. W. 157 (1913) ; Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich. 580, 64 N.
W. 278.
'See note 1, supra.
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thirty days demand instrument with the ultimate maturity date fixed.
If, however, the bank is to have the right to require notice of thirty
days anytime up until the specified due date, the maturity date is
virtually extended to thirteen months from the time of issue. In
either case, however, it seems that the date of maturity is sufficiently
certain to be a fixed and determinable future time within the mean-
ing of the N. I. L.,10 since it is in the power of the holder by merely
giving notice (or making demand) to establish a definite outside
limit on the time for payment.
As the court held the certificate of deposit to be negotiable and the
holder to be one in due course, the defendant's claim to right of
set-off was denied."1 The inference seemed to be that had the holder
not been one in due course the set-off would have been allowed.
There is a conflict of authority on this point.'
2
M. P. MYERS.
One Stanley was recently indicted in Georgia for the offense of
"forgery of a fictitious check." He pleaded guilty and was sen-
tenced. Now he files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging
that he is illegally held, since the name signed to the check was his
own name. The court decided that he could not be discharged under
habeas corpus on this contention, since that was a matter of defense
which should have been pleaded at the trial. Two judges dissented.
Stanley v. Beavers, 139 S. E. 344 (Ga. 1927).
BILLS AND NOTES-CONSIDERATION FOR AcCOMMODATION EN-
DORSEMENT-FoRBEARANCE FOR INDEFINITE TIME-In a recent
North Carolina case' the holder of a past due note agreed to extend
the time of payment to the maker for "three or four years," in con-
sideration of a third party's endorsement and agreement to be liable
for the payment thereof. The interesting problem raised by the case
is: what degree of certainty in time for payment is necessary for
an extension on a negotiable instrument?
"0Dorsey v. Wolff, 142 Ill. 589, 32 N. E. 495, 18 L. R. A. 428 (1892) ; Easley
v. Tenn. Nat. Bank, 130 Tenn. 366, 198 S. W. 66 (1917) ; Shaw v. Camp, 160
111. 425, 43 N. E. 608.
' Deavenport v. Green River Deposit Bank, 138 Ky. 352, 128 S. W. 88, 137
Am. St. Rep. 386 (1910) ; Taylor v. Carmon, 153 N. C. 101, 68 S. E. 1058
(1910) ; Johnson Co. Saving Bank vz. Renfro, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 160, 122 S. W.
37 (1909).
228 C. J. 803, § 1062.
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Definiteness, for the time of payment, is to be distinguished
where it is a requisite for the negotiability of a note and where it
is a requirement for contractual obligation. A note payable in three
or four years, whether negotiable or not,2 may be definite enough
to constitute a good contract, enforceable between the parties thereto.3
So an agreement to extend the time of payment three or four years
on a negotiable instrument, like any other contract must be certain
as to time for performance, but this certainty of time requirement
is not a requisite in the same degree or sense that it is for nego-
tiability.
In a contemporaneous case 4 the same question, of what degree
of certainty in time for payment is required to extend, came before
a Georgia court upon the following similar facts. The holder of a
past due note, in consideration of a third party depositing collateral
with the holder, agreed to extend the time for payment but the time
for payment was left indefinite. The decision of the court, while
showing that the case was properly considered and decided upon the
principles of contract, said: "The promise to extend the time of pay-
ment is so indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement, and therefore
constitutes no consideration for the act of the stranger in depositing
the collateral." Bearing in mind that in both cases no question of
negotiability was before the court this uncertainty of time of pay-
ment is pertinent only to the question of validity of the contract to
extend. Therefore these two cases differ only in their degree of
indefiniteness.
The holder's promise to extend is consideration for the third
party's act or promise to become liable with the maker. If by the
indefiniteness of the promise made, the promisor neither suffered
detriment nor gave up any right which he had before the promise,
then there was no consideration for the liability assumed by the third
party, and no contract.6 The North Carolina court held that the
N. I. L., Art. 1, sec. 3; C. S. 2982. Duncan v. Louisville, 13 Bush. 378, 26
Am. Rep. 201 (Ky. 1877). Note made payable in one or two years after date,
held negotiable. This view is open to Dean Ames criticism that "nothing could
be more inconsistent with the negotiability of a bill or note than that the ho-der
should have to be continually on the alert to ascertain the precise day when they
should become payable, in order to charge the drawer or indorser." 2 Ames
Cases Bills and Notes p. 831; Norton, Bills and Notes (1914) 4th Ed. p. 51.
'See Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 25, 37 Am. Rep. 604 (1880), although this
case is in part no longer good law on the point of negotiability. N. I. L. § 2,
C. S. 2983.
" Abraham v. First Bank of Cook Co., 134 S. E. 583 (Ga. 1927).
'Williston on Contracts No. 136, Vol. 1 (1920), "If an agreement to forbear
is only for such time as the promisor shall choose, it is not sufficient con-
sideration." Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 342, 39 N. E. 330 (1895).
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extension for three or four years "was definite at least for three
years,"6 and this viewpoint brings the case within the general rule
that an extension for a definite period is good consideration for the
third party's promise to be liable.7 But the question still remains
whether a promise to extend for an indefinite time is good consider-
ation. The Georgia court was of the opinion that it was not.
Agreements to extend or forbear, however, when the specific
period therefor is not stated, contemplate a reasonable time. 8 So the
promise given to extend, even though indefinite as to time, as in the
Georgia case, has the natural implication that extension for a reason-
able time is agreed upon. An extension or forbearance for a reason-
able time being good consideration it follows that, if from the facts
of that case, the indefinite extension is meant to be for a reasonable
time, such an indefinite extension is not lacking consideration or
incapable of enforcement.9
F. B. GumFMY, II.
Plaintiff, wholesaler, entered into a contract with defendant,
retailer, to sell goods to the latter for a certain period. It was stipu-
lated in the contract that it might be terminated by either party by
written notice and that credit would be extended to defendant until
its termination. In pursuance of the contract, plaintiff sold certain
goods to the defendant and not being paid therefor, brought suit
for the price, though he did not give defendant any notice of the
termination of the contract nor had the time for its expiration ar-
rived. Held, that plaintiff, by refusing to sell except for cash, had
breached the contract, and, consequently, a counterclaim set up by
defendant should be allowed. W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Wilson et al.,
(1927) 139 S. E. 395.
'Hamilton v. Prouty, 50 Wis. 592, 7 N. W. 659, 36 Am. Rep. 866. Three
possible views: (a) Three or four years at option of the maker, (b) three
years and then demand up to four years, (c) three or four years to option of
the holder.
18 C. J. § 629, n. 33; 1 Joyce Defenses to Commercial Paper, (2nd Ed.)
sec. 331; Bank v. Oakes, 184 Mo. App. 598, 170 S. W. 679 (1914); Boyd v.
Kelley, 111 Miss. 629, 71 So. 897 (1916) ; Reynolds v. Citizen's Bank of Moul-
trie, 22 Ga. App. 164, 95 S. E. 763 (1918) ; Burke v. Dillon, 92 Ia. 557, 61 N. W.
371 (1894) ; 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, note; O'Gara, King and Co. v. Hansing,
88 Minn. 401, 93 N. W. 307 (1903) ; Rix v. Adams, 9 Vt. 233, 31 Am. Dec. 619
(1837).
'I Williston, Contracts, §§ 38, 136 (1920) and cases cited; 5 N. C. L.
Rev. 78.
'2 Williston, Contracts, § 1226; McMicken v. Safford, 197 Ill. 540, 64 N. E.
540 (1902) ; Traders Nat. Bank v. Parker, 130 N. Y. 415, 29 N. E. 1094 (1892) ;
Drake v. Pueblo Nat. Bank, 44 Colo. 49, 96 Pac. 999 (1903) ; Nott v. State Nat.
Bank, 51 La. Ann. 871, 25 So. 475 (1899) ; Glasscock v. Glasscock, 66 Mo. 627
(1877) ; King v. Upton, 4 Greenl. 387 (Me. 1877) ; cf. N. I. L. § 25, C. S. 3005.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-REGULATION
OF BUsEs-Plaintiff brought suit to restrain the Public Utilities
Commission from interfering with the operation of his bus line be-
tween Providence and Woonsocket, both in Rhode Island, the route
being diverted through a part of Attleboro, Massachusetts. Plaintiff
claimed that he was engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore,
needed no permit from the Rhode Island authorities as required by
law. The Public Utilities Commission was of opinion that plaintiff
had no bona fide intention of engaging in interstate transportation,
that the number of interstate passengers would be negligible, and
that he was diverting his route through this thinly settled portion of
Massachusetts merely to escape regulation. Held, to constitute "in-
terstate commerce" by a bus line, it is not sufficient that its busses
cross a state line, but they must transport passengers or goods inter-
state or intended in good faith to do so. Inter-City Coach Co. v.
Atwood (Dist. Ct. R. I., 1927), 21 Fed. (2nd.) 83.
Although Congress has the undoubted power under the commerce
clause to regulate motor vehicles, it has not yet done so.1 In the
absence of such regulation, the states, in the exercise of their re-
served police power, have the power to regulate them, provided the
regulations concern local matters not demanding uniformity of regu-
lation, and do not constitute a direct or material burden on interstate
commerce. 2 It has been definitely settled that a bus line engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce may not be prohibited from using
the state highways,3 though they may be subjected to reasonable regu-
lations. 4 It has also been held that a bus line carrying passengers
both intrastate and interstate may be regulated, and even prohibited
from carrying intrastate passengers provided the prohibition does
not unduly burden or prohibit the carriage of the interstate pas-
'The Interstate Commerce Act, U. S. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1916, sec. 8563, p.
9048 et seq.; Supp. 1923, sec. 8563, p. 2427 et seq., which governs interstate
commerce by railroads and other designated agencies, does not assume to regu-
late interstate commerce by motor vehicles. Interstate Transit Co. v. Derr,
71 Mont, 222, 228 Pac. 624 (1924).2 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 318 (U. S. 1851) ; Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399 (1912) ; Hendrick v. State of Maryland (1915),
235 U. S. 610, 622, 35 Sup. Ct. 140.
Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1914) ; Bush v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317
(1914). See 25 Columbia Law Rev. 670 (1925).
4Hendrick v. Maryland, supra, where the court said that the operation of
motor vehicles is attended with public danger and expense, and that a state may
take measures necessary to minimiie these disadvantages, even though some
of the vehicles subject to regulation are engaged in interstate commerce. Ac-
cord, Kane v. New Jersey (1916), 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30.
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sengers. 5 In the instant case, under the decisions mentioned above,
it seems certain, that if the plaintiff was engaged in interstate com-
merce exclusively, the state would have no power to refuse him the
use of its highways. It seems, also, that though he was engaged in
carrying both intrastate and interstate passengers, it could at most
only prohibit his intrastate business. The problem is therefore re-
duced to the question of whether the plaintiff was engaged in inter-
state or only intrastate commerce and the decision of the case rested
on this issue.
The Supreme Court has never defined the bounds of what con-
stitutes interstate commerce. 6  By the overwhelming weight of
authority, commerce through two states, though the termini are in
the same state, is interstate commerce as a matter of fact; the fact
must be tested by the actual transaction.7 A few cases which have
indicated that the motive was material and could change the char-
acter of the commerce, so as to preclude a fraudulent evasion of the
state laws seem to proceed upon an erroneous theory.8 The trans-
action is interstate, factually. In determining whether a particular
transaction is interstate the Supreme Court has laid down the definite
and fixed rule that the physical facts shall govern, regardless of
motives or animating influences. 9 Cases like Austin v. Tennessee,10
relied on in the instant case, and Cook v. Marshall County," where
the tricks and devices of the defendants were not allowed to turn
boxes into "original packages," according to the rule laid down in
Brown v. Maryland,12 are to be distinguished; in these cases the
court held that the boxes were not actually "original packages"
within the constitutional import of the term as interpreted by the
5Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Ct. Ry. Co., 47 S. Ct.
' See Words and Phrases, Second Series, Vol. II, pp. 1157-1168.'Hanley v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. (1903), 187 U. S. 617, 23 Sup. Ct.
214; United States v. Delaware, etc. R. R. (C. C. 1907), 152 Fed. 269; United
States v. Erie R. R. (D. C. 1909), 166 Fed. 352; St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. Hadley
(C. C. 1909), 168 Fed. 317, 340; St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. State (1908), 87 Ark.
562, 113 S. W. 203; Mines v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. (1908), 134 Mo. App. 379,
388, 114 S. W. 1052; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight (1920), 254 U. S. f7,
41 Sup. Ct. 11; Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stroud (1925), 267 U. S. 404.
' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor (1914), 57 Ind. App. 93, 104 N. E. 771;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sharp (1915), 121 Ark. 135, 180 S. W. 504.
'"We cannot conclude that a legal domicile in Kansas, coupled with a repre-
hensible past and a purpose to avoid the statutes of the state, suffice to change
the nature of the transaction." Per McReynolds, J., in Kirmeyer v. Kansas
(1915), 236 U. S. 568, 573, 35 Sup. Ct. 419.
(1900) 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. 132.
(1905) 196 U. S. 261, 25 Sup. Ct. 233.
- (1827) 25 U. S. 419.
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Supreme Court up to 'that time.' 3 The instant case may be dis-
tinguished on similar grounds, in that it was "not a bona fide com-
mercial arrangement" and was not actually interstate commerce, but
a mere fiction. On principle, the case is certainly justifiable as it is
inconceivable that state control should be evaded by such methods.
R. T. GILES.
An employee of the A. C. L. R. R. Co. was murdered by another
employee. In an action based upon the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, the North Carolina court found actionable negligence of the
railroad company in not preventing the murder. 191 N. C. 153. On
cetiorari to U. S. Supreme Court-reversed. The court said, "It
would be straining the language of the act somewhat to say in any
case that a willful homicide 'resulted' from the failure of some
superior officer to foresee the danger and to prevent it." Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Southwell, 48 S. Ct. 25 (1927).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COI MERCE-STATE TAX-
ATION-A South Carolina statute' placing a graduated sales tax on
dealers in tobacco products received and sold within the state, to be
collected by affixing stamps to the "package from which normally
sold at retail" was held constitutional and not in conflict with the
constitution of the United States, 2 since the packages when taxed
had come to rest within the state and no longer formed a part of
interstate commerce.3
A state tax upon an article as property after it has come to rest
in the state is valid, and the fact that it was transported to the place
where taxed in interstate commerce is no objection to validity.4 An
immunity from taxation except for the purpose of inspection exists
with respect to articles imported into a state from a foreign country
by virtue of an express prohibition in the constitution of the United
States.5 This immunity exists as long as the goods remain in the
3 Kirineyer v. Kansas, supra, note 9, at p. 573.
'Tax Act, S. C., April 22, 1927 (35 St. at large, p. 121).
"U. S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.
'Doscher et al. v. Query et al., S. C. Tax Commission, 21 F. (2d) 521
(1927).4Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 S. Ct. 109, 29 L. Ed. 257 (1885) ; Hin-
son v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148, 19 L. Ed. 387 (1868) ; Woodruff v. Parhain, 8 Wall.
123, 19 L. Ed. 382 (1868) ; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 43 S.
Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed. 1095 (1923).
'Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 2.
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original package in which imported, and until sale is made.6 The
supposed analogy between imports and articles in original package
in interstate commerce is no longer followed.7 The protection of
interstate commerce is withdrawn when the article "comes to a state
of rest and is held by the consignee as stock for purposes of sale."8
The protection does not extend to the final sale. 9
A temporary delay or detention of the goods in course of transit
for the convenience of the carrier or that of the consignee in making
payment does not break the continuity of interstate shipment, and
release the goods from the protection of interstate commerce. 10 Ac-
cordingly, a tax upon the gross sales of oils shipped from other
states and later sold from the storeroom in the original package has
been held valid.'1
In the principal case an undetermined quantity of the goods re-
quired to be stamped was later shipped out of the state. By pro-
vision of the statute the amount of the tax was refunded for goods
shipped out of the state. The work of affixing the stamp was not a
burden onj interstate commerce. Goods are not in interstate com-
merce until they are actually in transit or given to the carrier for
that purpose. 12 The fact that goods are intended for export or ship-
ment in interstate commerce will not protect them from taxation if
the movement be not actually commenced.
13
Complainants insisted that the tax denied due process of law under
the Fourteenth Amendment since unpacking the boxes in order to
affix stamp to the individual packages in hands of wholesalers neces-
sitated a repacking, sometimes damaging the goods. The answer to
'Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827) ; Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128, (1890).
Woodruff v. Parham, supra, note 4, at 123; American Steel and Wire Co.
v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365, 48 L. Ed. 538 (1904) ; Texas Co. v.
Brown, 258 U. S. 466, 476, 42 S. Ct. 375, 66 L. Ed. 721 (1922); Sonneborn
Bros. v. Cureton, supra, note 4, at 506.
8Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, supra, note 4, at 522.
'Banker Bros. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210, 32 S. Ct. 38, 56 L. Ed. 168
(1911)."° Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 S. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715 (1886) ; La. R. R.
Commission v. Texas and Pacific R. R., 229 U. S. 336, 33 S. Ct. 837, 57 L. Ed.
1215 (1912) ; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 27 S. Ct. 606, 51
L. Ed. 987 (1907) ; Champlain Realty Co. v. Battleboro, 260 U. S. 366, 43 S. Ct.
146, 67 L. Ed. 309 (1922).
'- Sonneborn Bros. v. Ciureton, supra, note 4, at 506.
12 Coe v. Errol, supra, note 10, at 547.
Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S. 372, 23 L. Ed. 657 (1875) ; Turpin v. Burguess,
117 U. S. 504, 6 S. Ct. 835, 29 L. Ed. 988 (1886); General Oil Co. v. Crain,
209 U. S. 211, 28 S. Ct. 475, 52 L. Ed. 754 (1908).
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this argument would seem to be found in the statute itself which
allows a discount on the stamps purchased by those subjected to this
loss.
H. H. GODWIN.
The city of Atlanta, Georgia, passed an ordinance, the first sec-
tion of which prohibited colored barbers from serving as barbers of
white women, white girls or children under the age of 14 years. The
second section required that all barber shops in the city "shall thereafter
be closed during week days at 7 o'clock p.m. except on Saturday when
they shall close at 9 o'clock p.m. By an amendment to this section
it is provided that the opening hour shall be 5:30 a.m. Held, Section
1 is void, being in violation of those sections of the state and federal
constitutions which guarantee equal protection of the laws, invio-
lability of property rights, and due process of law. Section 2 is void
as being unreasonable and discriminatory because it seeks to regu-
late "one particular lawful business that is in no wise noxious" but
leaves unregulated various other businesses. Chaires v. City of
Atlanta, 139 S. E. 559 (Ga., 1927).
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-STOP, LOOK, LISTEN, AND IF NEC-
ESSARY GET OuT-Plaintiff's intestate was killed in a crossing by a
train running at sixty miles an hour. Intestate had no practical view
of the track until he was twelve feet from danger and the engine was
then obscured beyond two hundred and forty-three feet by a section
house. He drove on the track at a rate of five or six miles an hour
and was killed. It was not shown that he stopped or listened for the
train. Held, recovery is denied. Failure of the traveller to stop and
get out of his vehicle to see if a train is approaching is contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman,
48 S. Ct. 24 (1927).
It has been held that failure to stop before attempting to cross a
railroad track is negligence per se.1 The majority view is that failure
to stop, look, and listen must be considered under the circumstances.
2
'Hines v. Cooper, 204 Ala. 519, 86 So. 396 (1920) ; Benner v. Phil. & R. Ry.
Co., 262 Pa. 307, 105 A. 283 (1918).'Flannelly v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 225 U. S. 597 (1912); Perry v. R.
R., 180 N. C. 290, 104 S. E. 673 (1920); N. C. Cons. Stat. 2621 (b) (1923),
requires full stop at grade crossings but provides that no failure to stop shall
be considered contributory negligene per se but shall be considered with the
other circumstances; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Schneider, 257 Fed. 675
(1919) ; Judson v. Central Vermont R. Co., 158 N. Y. 597, 53 N. E. 514 (1899).
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It may be evidence of negligence or if the facts are undisputed and if
only one inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom, the question
of negligence or contributory negligence is one of law for the court.3
Some courts say that if the traveller is otherwise unable to see
an approaching train he is as a matter of law required to stop his
vehicle, get out and look.
4
In the principal case the court says, "If a driver cannot be sure
otherwise whether a train is dangerously near, he must stop and get
out of his vehicle. It is true that the question of due care very gen-
erally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of
conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once
for all, by the courts."
The standard of conduct which the court says is clear is the duty
to stop, look, and listen before going on a railroad track. If the view
is unobstructed there is no reason for stopping; if reasonable men
might differ as to the necessity of stopping, it is a question for the
jury; if the necessity is plain, it is a question of law for the court.
It is submitted that the opinion must be construed with reference
to the facts and that the standard of conduct may be modified by due
care under the circumstances. Any other interpretation would be
an unwarranted encroachment upon the province of the jury.5
S. SHARF.
In the recent case of A. L. Pridgen v. M. R. Gibson, 194 N. C.
289, 139 S. E. 443 (1927), the trial court refused to allow a general
practitioner of medicine to testify as an expert witness in regard to
eye trouble, for the reason he failed to qualify as a specialist in that
field of practice. The Supreme Court found error and sent the case
back for a new trial, holding that the question whether only a spe-
cialist in a narrow field of medicine can testify as an expert in that
field is a question of law subject to review by the Appellate Court and
not a mere preliminary question in respect to skill and experience,
"Heitman v. Pac. Electric R. R. Co., 10 Cal. A. 397, 102 P. 15 (1909) ; Mor-
rison v. Lee, 16 N. D. 377, 113 N. W. 1025 (1907) ; Hagglund v. Erie R. Co.,
210 N. Y. 46, 103 N. E. 770 (1913).
'Thompson v. So. Pac. Co., 31 Cal. App. 567, 161 P. 21 (1916); Benner v.
Phil. &R. Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 307, 105 A. 283 (1918). Contra: St. Louis I. M. &
S. R. Co. v. Kimbrell, 117 Ark. 457, 174 S. W. 1183 (1915); Mitchell v. St.
Louis & S. F. R. Co., 97 S. W. 552 (1906) ; Chicago R. I. & G. Ry. Co., 226
S. W. 1080 (Tex. 1921) ; Louisville & I. R. Co. v. Clore, 183 Ky. 261, 209 S.
W. 55 (1919).
'(1900) 13 Harv. L. Rev.; (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 303.
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which questions are matters of judicial discretion. To hold that a
witness is precluded from testifying as an expert simply because he
is not a "technical" expert in a narrow field or branch of medicine is
prejudicial error and does not represent a case of "irreviewable dis-
cretion."
COVENANTS RESTRICTING THE USE or LAND-PUBLIC POLIC'Y-
RESTRAINT OF TRDE-INuNcTIoNs---One Posey, the purchaser of
a certain lot, covenanted to use the Standard Oil Company's gas and
oil as long as Smith, his grantor, acted as agent for the company and
prices of their products should be in accord with those of rival com-
panies. The Gulf Refining Company purchased the property of
Posey, and in an action by Smith to enjoin them from a breach of
the covenant, contended that the covenant was contrary to public
policy as being in restraint of trade and tending to defeat com-
petition.1
At early common law all contracts in restraint of trade were
void,2 but this was gradually qualified by a distinction between gen-
eral and partial restraints.3 Most jurisdictions now consider the
reasonableness of the restraint as the true test in determining the
enforceability of the contract.4 Public policy is the test of reason-
ableness; if the restriction unduly burdens the covenantor or the pub-
lic interest, or if it transcends the limits of utility to the covenantee;
then it is unreasonable.5 "No precise boundary can be laid down
within which the restraint would be reasonable and beyond which is
excessive." O The reasonableness of the restriction is a question of
law for the court.
7
Agreements by the covenantor not to use his land in competition
with the covenantee or in a manner obnoxious to him are generally
1 The Gulf Refining Co. v. Smith, 139 S. E. 716 (Ga. 1927).
'Pollock, Principles of Contracts, pp. 427, 428.
'Broad v. Jollyfe, 3 Cro. Jac. 596 (1620) ; Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms.
181 (1711).
"Nordenfelt v. The Maxim Co. [1894], App. Cases 573; Cowan v. Fair-
brother, 118 N. C. 406, 24 S. E. 212 (1896) ; Swigert v. Tilden, 121 Iowa 650,
97 N. W. 82 (1903). But some courts retain the general and partial restraint
distinction. See, Bonner v. Bailey 152 Ga. 629, 110 S. E. 875 (1922).
'Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620, 128 S. E. 895 (1925) ; Cowan v. Fairbrother,
supra, note 4.
'Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (1831).
'1 Wharton, Contracts, sec. 433; Hood v. Legg, supra, note 5; Wiley v.
Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66, 49 Am. Rep. 427 (1884) ; Rakestray v. Lanier, 104
Ga. 188, 30 S. E. 735 (1898).
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held valid. 8 In a conveyance of land a restriction was upheld pro-
viding that rock taken therefrom should only be for railway pur-
poses and not for any use in such business as the grantor is en-
gaged.9 Probably the same result would follow if the restriction
had been not to use any rock for any purpose.' 0 Supposing the rock
however, to have been of a particular sort which the public could not
obtain on'the market, then no doubt a total restriction upon its use
would not be upheld." The courts have held valid covenants in
deeds providing that no liquors be sold on the purchased premises.
12
Suppose that at a date when dealing in liquors is lawful, A owns
extensive town lots and makes sales therefrom covenanting in the
deeds not to sell whiskey in a certain block of the land retained by
him. This restriction would probably be enforced,' 3 but suppose A
has been a dealer in whiskey and when he sold his lots his grantees
promised not to sell whiskey on the purchased premises. This would
confine the control of the town's supply of whiskey in the grantor
and would be void since it creates a monopoly.' 4 As to most com-
modities such a restraint would not be allowed, but since it is better
for the public to restrain instead of encourage the sale of whiskey,
the monopoly might be upheld.' 5
The case in question appears reasonable in fact. There was only
a partial restraint and there was no substantial injury to the public
interest; nor would there have been even had Posey covenanted not
to sell any gasoline on the premises. 16 The restriction did not have
the effect of defeating competition because other gas could be pur-
S University Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N. E. 790 (1914) ;
Williston, Contracts, sec. 1642, citing Pavkovich v. So. Pac. Ry. 150 Cal. 39, 87
Pac. 1097 (1906) ; Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. 335 (1887) ; Wat-
rous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362; 24 N. W. 104 (1885).
9Pavkovich v. So. Pac. Ry., supra, note 8.
"Hodge v. Sloan, supra, note 8, wherein a restriction that the grantee should
sell no sand from the premises was held valid. But see Brewer v. Marshall, 19
N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679 (1868) ; Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2
N. E. 946 (1885).
' Equitable Servitudes, 16 Mich. L. P. 103 (1917), a criticism of Norcro.ss
v. James, supra, note 10.
' Cowell v. Spring Co., 100 U. S. 55 (1879) ; Ferris v. Am. Brewing Co., 155
Ind. 539, 58 N. E. 701 (1900); Watrous v. Allen, supra, note 8.
"3Anderson v. Rowland, 44 S. W. 911 (Tex. Civ. App., 1898). Here an
agreement was upheld whereby the grantor promised not to sell whiskey in any
building owned by him in the same block for five years.
"4 Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 93 Pac. 1022 (1907).
'Restrictive Agreements as to the use of property, 21 Harv. L. R. 450
(1908) ; Watrous v. Allen, supra, note 8.
"Hodge v. Sloan, supra, note 8.
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chased if the Standard Oil Company's prices became higher. Thus
the injunction was properly granted.
This is the second appearance of this case. The Gulf Refining
Company in an earlier action tried to avoid this covenant by claiming
that it was only binding upon Posey. But the court there held it to
be a covenant running with the land and thus binding upon those
who owned the premises.1 7 This holding warrants comment.
"It is in many cases a matter of much doubt whether a covenant
with respect to the use and occupation of land runs with the land, so
as to bind at law an assignee, although assigns be expressly named
in the covenant,"' 8 but "Equity will restrain a breach of an agree-
ment between grantor and grantee restricting the use of the land,
both by the grantee himself and by all subsequent purchasers of the
land with notice, whether or not an equitable restriction or a cove-
nant running with the land is created."' 9 The covenant in the deed
from Smith to Posey served as notice to the Gulf Refining Company.
Where a party promises t6 use the land only in a certain manner the
presumption is that the intention is to bind the land20 and clearly no
contrary intent appears here. Usually equitable servitudes and cove-
nants running with the land are restrictions placed upon one piece of
land for the benefit of other land, however they may be for the
benefit of a business and if so intended the benefit will be enforce-
able by the assignee of the business.21 Therefore, since this cove-
nant is impersonal and is a restriction upon the use of the land, the
court was correct in enjoining any violation thereof by the grantee's
assignee, regardless of whether or not it was a covenant running
with the land or an equitable servitude.
CHAMES W. McANALLY.
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 Fed. (2d) 396 (C. C.
A. 2nd. 1927). In 1917 our state department recognized Kerensky's
provisional government, successor to the Imperial Russian govern-
"Smith v. Gulf Refining Co., 162 Ga. 191, 134 S. E. 446 (1926).
"Kerr, Injunctions, 474.
The theory of Restrictive agreements as to a business (1911), 24 Harv. L.
R. 574, citing Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774 (1848); Parker v. Nightingale, 6
Allen 341 (Mass. 1863).
'2 Tiffany, Real Property (2 ed.) sec. 397.
'Clark, Equity, sec. 100; Abergare Brewery Co. v. Holmes, 1 Ch. 288
(1900); Francisco v. Smith, 143 N. Y. 488, 38 N. E. 946 (1894); Hodge v.
Sloan, supra, note 8. But see, Norcross v. James, supra, note 10. Judge
Holmes' argument seems untenable. Case does not represent the modern
tendency. Only way decision can be upheld is on theory that the agreement
tends to creat a monopoly.
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ment, and received her ambassador. In 1918 under his authority,
suit was brought against the defendant in a federal court for loss in
1916 of munitions consigned to the Russian government. Since the
ambassador's retirement in 1922 the state department has recognized
the custody of the property of the Russian government to be in a
financial attache of the Russian embassy, who has continued the suit
in the name of the state of Russia. Our state department has never
recognized the Soviet government which came into power in the fall
of 1917. The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff. It held
that the plaintiff had power to sue on the ground that the cause of
action was the property of the state of Russia and that it was bound
to recognize the condition of things in Russia which was last recog-
nized by the political department. Quaere: The short-lived pro-
visional Russian government being no longer existant what becomes
of the proceeds of the judgment?
CRIMINAL LAW-BILLS AND NoTEs--Is ONE WHO WITHOUT
AUTHORITY SIGNS FIRM CHECK AS AGENT OR PARTNER A "DRAWER"
UNDER THE BAD CHECK LAws-Defendant was convicted of ob-
taining property with intent to defraud by means of a worthless
check.1 The check was signed "A. & W. Cotton Co., by E. 0.
Anderson." He appeals, assigning as error that the trial court in-
structed the jury in such a manner that defendant's guilt would
depend on a question of fact whether or not he was a partner of the
firm A. & W. Cotton Co. A new trial was granted. The opinion
is undoubtedly correct but it leaves several questions undecided
which may arise on the new trial. These may be divided into three
main headings. 1. Even though the defendant is not a partner, he
may be an agent with authority to draw checks for the firm.2 2. His
authority to draw checks for the firm may have been revoked but
uncommunicated to him at the time of drawing the present check, in
which event he could not be presumed to have an intent to defraud.
3. The statute being aimed at the drawer of the check it becomes
material to determine who is the drawer of a check signed in a firm
name by an agent, (a.) one who is authorized and, (b.) one without
authority.
'State v. Anderson, 194 N. C. 377, 139 S. E. (1927). C. S. 4283 makes the
giving of a worthless check, with the intent to defraud another by obtaining
property in return, a misdemeanor. "By means of a check ... upon a bank
... not indebted to the drawer."
IFirst Nat. Bank of Salem v. Jacobs, 85 W. Va. 653, 102 S. E. 491 (1920).
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The instructions were insufficient in that Anderson's membership
in the firm is not necessarily determinant of his guilt. It is very
possible and probable that he might be acting as an agent for the
A. & W. Cotton Co.3 His guilt depends on whether he had no
authority to write checks for the company and knew it.
The making of an untruthful representation is not of itself
fraudulent. It becomes so only by being accompanied with a fraudu-
lent intent.4  Even though the defendant's authority has been re-
voked the burden is still on the state to show that he knew he acted
without authority in signing the check. The unpaid check is of
itself evidence of non-payment. As evidence of lack of authority,
it and the slip attached by the bank to show the reason for non-
payment are clearly hearsay, and none the less so because written.5
It is furthermore unlikely that the paper would be admitted under
the business entry exception because of the entrant's lack of first
hand knowledge.
0
Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law7 provides that
"Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature
words indicating that he signs on behalf of a principal, or in a repre-
sentative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly
authorized." Under this section it seems that he is liable as a
drawer rather than on his warranty. 8 Dean Ames says: "This new
rule involves a flat contradiction of the instrument, and the fiction
works not justice but injustice."9 He adds that the agent is liable
only on an implied warranty and should not be liable to the payee for
the face of the note.10 This section is defended however by Lyman
D. Brewster 1 and Charles L. McKeehan.12
Who is the drawer of a check signed "A. & W. Cotton Co., by
E. 0. Anderson," first, if Anderson has authority to sign checks;
secondly, if his authority to sign has been revoked? The above-
'Somers v. Hanson, 78 Oreg. 429, 153 Pac. 43 (1915).
'11 R. C. L. 241.
'3 Wigmore, Evidence (1923) sec. 1363.
3 Wigmore, Evidence (1923) sec. 1530; Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 138 N. C. 42, 50 S. E. 452 (1905) ; document admitted where knowl-
edge of entrant was made on the basis of a report of another employee with first
hand knowledge.
" The corresponding section in the North Carolina Statutes is C. S. 3001.
"Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Rossman, 196 Mo. App. 78, 190 S. W. 636 (1916).
'14 Harv. L. Rev. 241.
"*Bryson v. Lucas, 84 N. C. 680 (1881).
' Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1901), 15 Har. L. Rev. 26.
McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1902), 50 Am. L. Rev. (old
Series) 437.
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
quoted section of the N. I. L. says that Anderson is liable on the
instrument if he has no authority, and since the worthless check
statute13 says that if the bank upon which the checlc is drawn is not
indebted to the drawer, is or is not the defendant guilty under the
latter statute? Is being liable on a check where there is no principal
to be bound by the agent the same as being the drawer of a check?
The rule in civil cases is that an unauthorized agent who signs in
a representative capacity becomes liable on the instrument.14 It has
been suggested that this interpretation be limited to cases in which
the unauthorized agent would be liable on his implied warranty. 15 If
this view be extended to a criminal prosecution the person obtaining
property by giving a worthless check may be considered guilty by
virtue of the willful misrepresentation. If the principal for whom
the agent purports to sign is fictitious then it seems quite proper to
consider the writer of the check the drawer. He is, in the definition
of Bouvier, "the party who makes the bill of exchange." The au-
thorized agent of a company or corporation binds his principal as
drawer of a check under section 20,16 and if there are insufficient
funds it is submitted that under C. S. 4283 the agent would not be
liable as the drawer.
JON WIIG.
Village of University Heights et al v. Cleveland Jewish Orphan's
Home, 20 F (2nd) 743 (C. C. A. 6th. 1927). Plaintiff had a zoning
ordinance designating the kind of buildings which were to be erected
on the lots in the town and also stating that the town was essentially
a residential district. The orphanage which defendant sought to
erect would in no wise conflict with the requirements as to the
kind of buildings since it was to consist of separate houses, but per-
mission was refused on ground that public convenience and welfare
would not be served. The court declared, however, that such a con-
struction of the law was unreasonable and that there was discrimi-
nation against the defendant.
1 C. S. 4283.1 Eisinger v. E. J. Murphy Co., 52 App. Cases, D. C. 197, 285 Fed. 931
(1922).
" 23 Colum. L. Rev. 392, note.Chatham Nat. Bank v. Gardner, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 135, citing sec. 20, N.
I. L.
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CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTIONS-PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
-The judge charged the jury in a murder case on the principle of
reasonable doubt, but failed to say anything about the presumption
of innocence, the defendant not having requested any such charge.
Defendant excepted but on appeal the judgment of the lower court
was upheld.'
Whether the presumption of innocence should be charged along
with reasonable doubt turns upon whether the presumption is to be
regarded as evidence. If it is evidence then it should be included in
the charge but if not it would not be error to omit it. The North
Carolina court in the case of Stewart v. R. R.2 adopted the view as
expressed in Coffin v. U. S. :3 "A presumption of law is evidence.
In all systems of law presumptions are treated as evidence. The
presumption is one of the instruments of proof." The application
was to the presumption of negligence but the court intimates that the
same applies to all presumptions. Taking that to be the law, the
present case4 establishes a new position.
If the presumption is to be regarded as evidence then the parties
do not stand equal at the beginning as in a civil case. The defendant
has the presumption in his favor to start with and the state must
produce evidence to overcome it. Not only must the state overcome
it, for in that event the parties would stand equal, but it must estab-
lish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Under
this consideration the jury should have the presumption before them
as something in favor of the defendant. Thus a charge as to reason-
able doubt but omitting the presumption of innocence would deprive
the defendant of something to which he was entitled. This is the
view taken by the court up to the present time and is one followed
in other jurisdictions5 and is sponsored by Greenleaf. 0
The view which appears more sound and reasonable is the one
taken by our court now and one sponsored by Wigmore7 and Thayer8
'State v. Boswell, 194 N. C. 260, 139 S. E. 374 (1927).2 Stewart v. R. R., 137 N. C. 687, 50 S. E. 312 (1905).
Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 39 L. Ed. 481 (1894).
'State v. Boswell, 194 N. C. 260, 139 S. E. 374 (1927).
Alabama, Nebraska, and Vermont.
'1 Greenleaf, Evidence, Part I, ch. 4, sect. 34. "This legal presumption is
to be regarded in every case, as a matter of evidence, to the benefit of which
the party is entitled."
5 Wigmore, Evidence, Sect. 2511. "No presumption can be evidence, it is a
rule about the duty of producing evidence."
'Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, Appendix
B, p. 551; 16 C. J. 535 Section 1007; Culpepper v. Slate, 4 Okla. Cr. 103, 111
Pac. 679, 31 L. R. A. N. S. 1166 (1910).
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and which has been adopted in many jurisdictions.9 Under this con-
sideration the presumption need not be charged for it is not consid-
ered as evidence. The presumption takes the fact of innocence as
established rather than being evidence in and of itself and throws
the burden of proof upon the state. There is no weighing of the
evidence of the state on the one side and the presumption on the
other. The presumption merely gives the court a rule to keep in
mind as to the production of evidence. Coupled with the principle
of reasonable doubt it makes it necessary that the state produce
enough evidence to show the guilt of the defendant beyond a reason-
able doubt. This presumption does away with any reflection which
might be cast upon the defendant by the fact of his being charged
with a crime and is not evidence to be weighed in his favor.
The view of the court in this case'0 establishes a new position,
one which conforms to reason more than the former view and one
which is being backed by an ever increasing number of jurisdictions.
ANDREw C. MCINToSH.
In Raven v. Laurens, 139 S. E. 546 (Ga., 1927), an injunction
was granted restraining defendant from erecting a filling station in a
residential subdivision in violation of a building restriction not con-
tained in deed, but of which defendant had notice. Such restrictive
covenants are enforceable in equity.
CRIMINAL LAW- JURISDICTION - OFFENSE COMM rTTED ON
AMERICAN VESSEL IN FOREIGN PORT-The relator was indicted
under sec. 272 of the Federal Criminal Code defining and prescribing
punishments for homicides committed on American vessels "upon the
high seas or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States." The act was committed upon an
American vessel moored to the wharf in an Italian port. Held, the
federal courts are without jurisdiction under the statute because the
offense was not committed on the high seas. United States ex rel.
Maro v. Matthews, 21 F. (2d) 533 (E. D. Pa., 1927).
The inferior federal courts have no criminal jurisdiction except
as provided by express enactment.' Congress is empowered by the
constitution to define and prescribe punishment for crimes committed
on the high seas.2 In the principal case, as pointed out by the court,
Iowa, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Connecticut.
," State v. Boswell, 194 N. C. 260, 139 S. E. 374 (1927).United States v. Wilson, 3 Blatchford 435, 28 Fed. Cas. 718.
'Fed. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10.
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jurisdiction was wanting unless the act was committed on the high
seas within the meaning of the statute. The courts construe "high
seas" as used by Congress in criminal legislation in the popular sense
as distinguished from land-locked territorial waters. 3 "The high
seas are the unenclosed waters of the ocean outside the projecting
capes." 4 In our case the court would not concede that a vessel lying
at anchor in a harbor would not be on the high seas. In the strictly
natural sense that would depend upon the physical characteristics
of the harbor. Certainly it would be within the limits of territorial
waters, which in the purview of international law extend a marine
league out into the sea from shore.5 For purposes of jurisdiction it
would be confusing to conceive of the high seas and territorial waters
as overlapping.
The common law theory of jurisdiction over crimes is territorial.
The civil law theory is personal. 6 The assumption of extra-terri-
torial jurisdiction by a sovereign over its citizens is recognized by
treaties giving such jurisdiction to consular courts and by the law
of nations in the punishment of piracy.
jurisdiction of vessels on the high seas cannot properly be based
on the territorial theory, though it is a common practice to apply it
to them7 on the theory that they are floating parts of the territory of
the sovereign whose flag they fly.8 The jurisdiction is, as a matter
of fact, personal jurisdiction, or tantamount thereto, and no fiction
is needed to support it.9
Unquestionably the local sovereign has exclusive territorial juris-
diction over ports and unless exempt by treaty vessels entering are
subject to the local law.10 It is none the less conceivable that the
same act might be an offense against the laws of several sovereigns,11
all upon different theories of jurisdiction. J. B. FORDHAM.
' United States v. Wilson, supra, note 2.
'Miller's Case, 17 Fed. Cas. 300.
'Moore, Digest of International Law (1904), 885; Hershey, Essentials of
International Public Law (1912), 195.
'For an extreme assertion of jurisdiction see Cutting's Case treated in I
Moore, Digest of International Law (1904), 228-242, where the Mexican gov-
ernment claimed criminal jurisdiction over a United States citizen for -a libel
published in Texas, copies of which were circulated in Mexico.
" 27 Harv. L. Rev. 269.
817 C. J. 170.
' Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law (1912) 220.
"0 Wildenhus's Case, 120 U. S. 1.
'As where a citizen of one state commits an offense on board a vessel of
another sovereign in a port of a third. Jurisdiction in the first case would be
personal, in the second personal as of the vessel, and in the third territorial.
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Georgia is evidently "fundamentalistic" in law as well as in
religion, for in a recent case a sales manager is held not to be an
officer, at least, an acceptance by the sales manager is not sufficient,
where a contract of sales required an acceptance by an officer.
Ralston Purina Co. v. Arthur, 139 S. E. 366 (Ga., 1927).
EViDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS ON PRESUMrPTIONs-The plaintiff al-
leged his barn was destroyed by sparks which were communicated to
it from defendant's engines, parked within fifty feet of the barn on
the night of the fire. There was proof that whenever the fires were
"chunked up" sparks would be freely emitted from the engines. It
was also proved that 11 o'clock p.m. was the regular hour to "chunk
up" the fires. The barn was discovered burning shortly after 11
p.m. From these facts the plaintiff asked the jury to infer that the
fires were "chunked up" on this night at the regular hour, that the
fires emitted sparks, and upon that basis to further infer that the
sparks from these engines caused the destruction of his barn. The
jury so found and the defendant asks that the verdict be set aside for
the reason the verdict was founded upon inference based on other
inferences and so invalid. Held, an inference may be based upon
another inference or presumption if the primary inference has the
standing of a proved fact. Virginia Ry. Co. v. London, 139 S. E.
328 (Va., 1927).
A great number of American courts pay dogmatic "lip service"
to a "rule" that "presumptions may not be based upon presumptions,
nor inferences upon inferences."1 The reason usually advanced for
this rule is that the primary inference is uncertain itself2 and the
evidence from which it is drawn too remote to be admissible on the
secondary inference, 3 changing the nature of the jury function from
the process of arriving at a conclusion to mere speculation. 4 Dean
United States v. Mammouth Oil Co., 14 F. (2nd.) 705, 717 (C. C. A. 8th.,
1926) ; I. W. Ringrose v. W. & J. Sloane, 266 F. 402 (E. D. Pa. 1920) ; Looney
v. Metropolitan R. R. Co., 200 U. S. 480, 488 (C. A. D. C. 1906) ; United States
v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281, 23 L. Ed. 707 (1875); Harris v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.) 283 S. W. 895 (1926); Johnson v. Western Express Co.,
107 Wash. 339, 181 P. 693 (1919) ; Globe Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gerish, 163 l11 625, 45
N. E. 563 (1896) ; Rimmer v. N. W. Ry. Co., 116 S. C. 190, 107 S. E. 479, 480
(1921).
United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281, 23 L. Ed. 707 (1875) ; Ohio Bldg.
Safety Valve Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 I11. 96, 115 N. E. 149 (1917).
'Baggess v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 207 Mo. App. 1, 229 S. W. 404 (1921).
'Stumpf v. Montgomery, 101 OkI. 257, 226 p. 65 (1924) ; Hays v. Hogan,
273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286 (1917).
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Wigmore contends that "there is no such rule, nor can be," advancing
as his reason for that position the fear that the rule that "an infer-
ence can never be based upon an inference," if strictly enforced,
would never permit an action to be adequately prosecuted.5 It is
submitted that both positions are misleading and contribute to the
confusion surrounding the subject by their failure to appreciate the
true significance of the distinction between "presumptions" or "in-
ferences" which are allowed for lack of more positive proof and
"presumptions" or "inferences" which have passed beyond that stage
and have assumed the dignity of established facts.0
This "rule" has been traced in origin to a quotation from Starkie
on Evidence. 7 The Virginia court has lucidly pointed out that much
of the confusion and misapplication of this theory is caused by a
misconception of what Starkie meant by "direct evidence," contend-
ing that he meant by that term any evidencec of logical, probative
force, either direct, testimonial, or circumstantial; and that whenever
evidence is established in the case "as a fact," whether established
by testimonial evidence or adduced by inference from circumstantial
evidence, "such fact may itself be taken as the basis for a new infer-
ence of fact."8 Whenever the terms of the rule are understood there
is no difficulty in a proper application of it, and it is a safe and valu-
able principle. It is submitted that the application of this rule by the
Virginia court in the instant case is the correct one: Whenever there
is a technical presumption, created only because of some procedural
'I Wigmore, Evidence (1923) 41: "It was once suggested that an 'inference
upon an inference' will not be permitted . . .and this suggestion has been
repeated by a few courts, and sometimes actually enforced. There is no such
rule, nor can be. If there were, hardly a single trial could be adequately prose-
cuted." Welch v. Chas. Frusch L. & P. Co., 197 Iowa 1012, 193 N. W. 427
(1923).
'Indian Creek Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 120 N. E. 709 (1918);
Rasport Water Co. v. Holnes Packing Co., 121 Me. 345, 117 A. 311 (1922);
Stock v. Gent. Baking Co., 283 Mo. 396, 223 S. W. 89 (1920) ; Sliwowski v. N.
Y. etc. Ry. Co., 94 Conn. 303, 108 A. 805 (1920) ; Indianapolis & Cinci. Trac-
tion Co. v. Monfort, 80 Ind. App. 639, 139 N. C. 677 (1923).
" 1 Starkie, Evidence (1824) 57: "In the first place, as the very foundation
of indirect proof is the establishment of one or more facts from which the
influence is sought to be made, the law requires that the latter should be estab-
lished by direct evidence, in the same manner as if they were the very facts in
issue."
'Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Wae, 122 Va. 246, 95 S. E. 183 (1918);
Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334, 363, 47 N. E. 157, 166 (1897) : "There is im-
portant exception to no 'inference upon inference' rule, however. A fact in
the nature of an inference may itself be taken as the basis of a new inference,
whether intermediate or final, provided the first inference has the required basis
of a proved fact"; I Greenleaf, Evidence, 34.
.224
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
convenience and not because of any inherent probability of its truth,9
such a presumption is not a legitimate foundation for another pre-
sumption; but where there is a presumption, in the true meaning of
the word, which accords with the natural inferences from the facts
proved, then the facts giving rise to such presumption are as pro-
bative as direct or testimonial evidence and should constitute a legiti-
mate foundation for another inference or presumption.
C. R. JONAS.
An automobile, driven by a chauffeur in an unlawful manner,
ran into another car and killed one of its occupants. The owner,
who was merely present in the car, was held guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. Moreland v. State, 139 S. E. 77 (Ga., 1927). Whether
a master sh ould be held criminally liable for the acts of his servant
in the scope of employment, thus extending the principles of agency
applicable in civil suits for damages, presents some interesting
questions.
GROUP INSURANcE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY UNDER GROUP
PoLIcy-Group life insurance is of comparatively recent origin, the
first policy having been issued in 1912, but it is steadily gaining
favor. This branch of insurance, simply defined, is the coverage of
a number of individuals-not less than fifty-by a single or blanket
policy. A more complete definition was embodied in the New York
Laws in 1918.1 This type of insurance is apparently intended for
the insurance of employees or certain groups of employees. Medical
examination is not required, because the indiscriminate insuring of
all the employees in a given employment or in a givevn class elimi-
nates or reduces to a minimum the individual selection against the
company. Medical examination is nothing more than an expedient
" This distinction is pointed out by Prof. Chafee in his article "Progress of
the Law,-Evidence" 35 Harv. Law Rev. 302, 310.
'New York Laws 1918, c. 192 (N. Y. Ins. Laws, § 101a). "Group insurance
is that form of life insurance, covering not less than fifty employees with or
without medical examination, written under a policy issued to the employer,
the premium on which is to be paid by the employer, or by the employer and
employees jointly, and insuring only all of his employees or all of any class or
classes thereof determined by conditions pertaining to the employment for
amounts of insurance based upon some plan which will preclude individual
selection, for the benefit of persons other than the employer; provided, however,
that when the premium is to be paid by the employer and employees jointly
and the benefits of the policy are offered to all eligible employees, not less than
75 per centum of such employees may be so insured."
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adopted to counteract the adverse selection which would result if
all applications were indiscriminately accepted by the companies.
There must be a group of at least fifty individuals to permit the law
of averages to work smoothly so that there may not be too large a
percentage of impaired lives within the group. Massachusetts in
1921,2 and North Carolina in 19253 followed New York in defining
"group insurance." The North Carolina statute incorporates stand-
ard provisions for policies of group insurance, the most important of
which are the requirements that individual certificates be issued to the
employees and a new individual policy if he leaves the employment,
and a provision for adding new employees who are eligible. The
employer is the policyholder during the employment and the certifi-
cate is merely informatory. The proceeds of the policy are exempt
from execution. The employee usually names a beneficiary but if
he omits to do so the proceeds of the policy go to his dependents.
The insurance money will not be paid to his estate if he has any
dependents or any relatives as close as brother or sister.
The recent case of Thompson v. Pacific Mills et al,4 which seems
to be the only decision concerning group insurance, decides that the
right of a beneficiary under group policy ended after the expiration
of one month temporary continuance after date for payment of an-
nual premium, in view of the terms of the policy placing no restriction
on the original contracting parties from entering into any contra't
for insurance. Nor did employer's failure to notify the beneficiary
of the cancellation of the group policy create liability on the theory
that by paying the premiums beneficiary might have taken advantage
of certain provisions, since employee covered by the policy could
obtain an individual policy only on termination of the employment
for any reason. The premiums were paid by the employer, and in
the certificate issued to the employee it was specifically stated that
the taking out of the policy did not establish a precedent to continue
the insurance. If as in some policies the insured has been required
to pay part of the premium, the beneficiary might justly have com-
plained of the failure of the employer to notify him of the can-
cellation; but under the circumstances of this case it was rightfully
held that the beneficiary had no cause of action against either the
employer or the insurance company. J. C. RODMAN, JR.
2Mass. Gen. Laws 1921, Ins. § 133.
'N. C. Pub. Laws 1925, c. 58.
'139 S. E. 619 (1927).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS-
IGNORANCE OF THE ExISTENCE OF A STATUTE AFFECTING COMPEN-
SATION-The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the case of
King v. Empire Collieries,' certified to it, held that where an em-
ployee was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment, the fact that he was doing at the time an act
prohibited and penalized by statute would not bar recovery "unless the
employer could show that the employee had knowledge of the statute,
or that reasonable steps had been taken to bring the statute to his
attention."
Decisions as to the effect of ignorance of the existence of a statute
upon compensation 2 under Workmen's Compensation Acts fall into
three groups: (1) those holding that such ignorance is no excuse,
(2) those holding that such ignorance is an excuse, and (3) those
holding that such ignorance is immaterial. This conflict in decisions
results from the different interpretations by the several courts of
the word "willful" 3 as used in the Workmen's Compensation Acts.
In keeping with the remedial and economically beneficent char-
acter of the acts,4 all courts agree that knowledge is an essential
element of wilfulness.5 The first group, however, unable to break
the shackles of precedent, declare that in cases of a violation of a
statute this knowledge is presumed as a matter of law.6 The second
group, realizing that the real basis of this presumption lies in its
1139 S. E. 478 (Va. 1927).
'Penna. holds that by violation of a statute the employee takes himself out
of the scope of his employment, thus defeating compensation. Mizzer v. Phila-
delphia etc. Coal Co., 289 Pa. 735, 137 At. 126 (1927).
'Many courts confuse the word "wilful" with the phrase "in course of em-
ployment." An amusing illustration is found in Kinsman v. Hartford Courant
Co., 108 At1. 562 (Conn.), where the court declared that if a reporter sticks his
head out of the street-car window carelessly or for his own purpose and is
injured, his conduct is wilful; but if he does so to see an airplane in order to
get a story for his paper, his conduct is not wilful.
State v. Kindelberger, 91 W. Va. 603, 114 S. E. 151; Austin Bros. Co. v.
Whitmire, 31 Ga. App. 560, 121 S. E. 345.
'E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Indus. Accident Conmission, 193 Pac. 105 (Cal.
1920).
'In Hay Shore Land Co. v. Indus. Acc. Cont., 172 Pac. 1128, (Cal. 1918),
the court says "There are two classes of cases the first where the provision
breached by the employee is a . . . private rule . . . of the employer. In this
class the employee must have actual knowledge of the rule's existence .... The
second class is where the provision breached . . . is a public statute. In this
class the employee is charged with knowledge ... and breach thereof is wilful
misconduct as a matter of law." See also Fidelity etc. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Corn.,
154 Pac. 834, L. R. A. 1916D 903, (Cal. 1916); Great Western Power Co. v.
Indus. Acct. Corn. 170 Cal. 180, 149 Pac. 35; Dobson v. United Collieries 8 Sc.
Sess. Cas. 5th series (Scot.) 241, (1905).
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necessity in the administration of justice,7 and realizing that it should
not be applied to defeat the benefits given by the acts, yet seemingly
unwilling to give full sanction to the economic hypothesis underlying
the acts, hold that this knowledge must be actual, or the lack of
knowledge the result of gross carelessness.8 The third group hold
that the knowledge required to defeat compensation is not a knowl-
edge of the existence or non-existence of a statute, but a knowledge
of the surrounding circumstances-an understanding on the part of
the workman that the act will probably result in injury to himself,0
and a deliberate persistence in spite of this understanding1o
It is submitted that this last group more fully appreciates the
economic bases"1 of the acts, and is to be commended. The rule is,
the industry must bear its own loss. The exception is, the wilful act
of the workman whereby he brings the loss upon himself. This
exception is necessary solely because the workman is able to bring
about an injury purposefully (in its commonly accepted meaning),
whereas a machine is not. Therefore, the true question is not, Did
the workman know that he was violating a statute, but rather, did
the workman know that his act, if persisted in, would probably re-
sult in injury? If the answer be affirmative, statute or no statute,
"Everyone capable to act for himself is presumed to know the law"-an
utterly impossible and, per se, untrue presumption, but one which in the interest
of the public is necessary. "It is at the foundation of the administration of
justice.. . . To allow ignorance as a defense would be to offer a reward to the
ignorant."--Pearson, J., in State v. Boyett, 32 N. C. 336. This presumption
should be restricted in its application rather than enlarged; and certainly has
no application to cases coming under the Compensation Acts.
'McNicol v. Spiers, 1 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th Series 604 (1899) ; King v. Empire
Collieries, note 1, supra. See also In re Burns 105 N. E. 601, (Mass.) ; Nicker-
son's Case, 218 Mass. 158, 105 N. E. 604; Baltimore Foundry Co. v. Ruzicka,
132 Md. 491, 104 At. 167 (1918).
'See Harlan Gas Coal Co. v. Trail, 213 Ky. 226, 280 S. W. 954 (1926).
1 Wick v. Gunn, 169 Pac. 1087 (Okl. 1918). See also Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. Scott, 278 S. W. 347 (Texas) ; Gornier v. Chase Companies, 97 Conn. 46, 115
Atl. 677.
' These Acts rest mainly upon the economic hypothesis that the losses in-
curred by an industry should be borne by that industry. Accidents wherein
workmen are disabled or killed result in losses analogous to those incurred by
the breakage or destruction of machines. The industry must bear the latter;
it should bear the former. It is not a question of whether the employer is at
fault, but whether the loss grew out of the industry. The legal objection has
been twofold. (1) The Acts impose a liability without fault upon the em-
ployer. [Ives v. South Buffalo Rwy., 201 N. Y. 271, 91 N. E. 431 (1911)].
This objection has been anticipated. (2) The employer-employee relationship
is one of contract and the parties are free to introduce any terms therein they
wish. But this freedom is the economic negative freedom, which is freedom
only in name. Economic necessity places the workman upon a decidedly
unequal basis to compete with his employer and compels him to contract to
his detriment.
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the workman should not recover; if negative, statute or no statute,
he should.
S. E. RoGERs.
WILLS-SPECIFIC LEGACIES-GIFT OF MERCANTILE BUSINESS
NOT SUBJECT TO DEBTS-Testator made a gift of ". . . my mer-
cantile business including stock of merchandise, note accounts, and
fixtures, located at Metter, Ga." subject to conditions, one of which
was that the business be continued ten years after testator's death
by his executors unless sooner terminated. Held, that this was a
specific legacy which would not be diminished to pay debts contracted
prior to testator's death for goods purchased for resale in the busi-
ness, but such debts should be paid out of the residuum and general
legacies. Bank of Statesboro et al v. Simmons, 139 S. E. 661 (Ga.,
1927).
The decision in this case was not unanimous, but seems to be
logically sound. There can be little doubt that the gift was a specific
legacy.' The gift is capable of being designated and identified, and
is sufficiently designated by the testator.2 The courts, however, will
not construe legacies as specific unless clearly so intended by the
testator.3 The business, though unincorporated and having no legal
existence, might well be the subject of a specific bequest even if the
testator had not so fully enumerated its physical constituents.
4
If the gift was a specific legacy, there can be little doubt that the
debts contracted by the testator for goods for resale in the business
should be paid out of the residuary estate and general legacies, and
not out of the specific legacy.5 The debt was the testator's personal
'See 10 Har. L. Rev. 454 (1896); Legacy of specific amounts in named
banks is specific legacy, Hart v. Brown, 145 Ga. 140, 88 S. E. 670 (1916). Be-
quest of all horses, cows, hogs, wagons, farming implements, household and
kitchen furniture, on plantation where testator resides is specific legacy, Mc-
Fadden v. Hefley, 28 S. C. 317, 5 S. E. 12, 13 A. S. R. 675 (1888). Bequest of
fund itself or a clear intention that the fund alone shall be the basis of pay-
ment of the legacy is specific, Hobbs v. Brennman, 94 W. Va. 320, 118 S. E.
546 (1923).
'Note 1, supra.
'May v. Serrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 617, 79 S. E. 1026 (1913); Hills
Adn'rs v. Hill, 127 Va. 341, 103 S. E. 605 (1920).
"Where testator authorized his executor in case his nephew and clerk
"should elect to carry on his business to permit them to do so without payment
for good will," it was held a specific legacy to the nephew and clerk, Fryer v.
Ward, 31 Beav. 602, 54 Eng. Rep. 1272 (1862). See note 1, supra.
"Gordon v. Jones, 86 Miss. 719, 39 So. 18 (1905), Dunn's Executors v.
Renick, 40 W. Va. 349, 22 S. E. 66 (1895) ; Heath v. McLaughlin, 115 N. C
398, 20 S. E. 519 (1894) ; In re Will of Perry Wiggin, 179 N. C. 326, 102 S. E.
499 (1920). See 28 R. C. L. 300.
